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The questionnaire had four parts:
1. Interview data
2. Institution/company identification
3. Respondent data
4. Institution perception regarding benefits 
from demining: includes demining as-
sessment, type of issues related to mined 
areas and infrastructure, and benefits af-
ter completion of demining operations
To carry out the survey, three manuals 
were prepared, one each for interviewers, su-
pervisors and reviewers.
Field research comprised data collection 
from the selected sample. INEC was responsible 
for the manual blueprints, sampling design and 
data collection. In order to obtain reliable infor-
mation, the survey was performed by direct in-
terviews of persons 16 years old and older.
From 4 October to 17 November 2006, data 
processing and analysis took place in INEC, 
which had professional personnel for recording 
and survey processing. Once data were verified, 
a supervisor reviewed the divergences and list-
ings to correct information if required. 
The result of the process was a database 
of dwellings and communities by district ac-
cording to the sampling. The final report was 
issued in April 2007.
Conclusions and Findings Summary
The impact of anti-personnel mines in 
Nicaragua not only affects the security of the 
population but also extends into areas that limit 
economic well being. Aspects such as uninhib-
ited movement of the population and security 
are presented as the most serious consequence 
of AP mines; access to communities, transpor-
tation, health, education, water and electricity 
are also affected. However, humanitarian-de-
mining efforts have positively affected those 
aspects that are relevant for the economic de-
velopment of affected communities.
There is a direct correlation between so-
cial indicators affected by AP mines and the 
benefits of demining operations, reaching the 
national level, where the demining impact 
resulted in the improvement of education, 
the health system and transportation.
Affected communities noted a sense of 
safety and confidence in their immediate 
environment as the most positive aspects of 
the demining. After demining operations, 
people living in the affected communities 
felt themselves safe from the threat of mines 
and as a consequence could move about 
their community with confidence that they 
would not step on a mine. Given that the 
main goal of humanitarian demining is to 
return cleared areas to productive use, the 
goal was reached.
There is a need to direct initiatives to-
ward land rehabilitation once land has been 
released. Likewise, it is necessary to de-
velop financing and technical cooperation 
proposals to assist formerly affected com-
munities improve the use of released land. 
National and local authorities must monitor 
cleared land in order to optimize its use. 
The population highly values demin-
ing operations. Community leaders, util-
ity companies and government entities 
involved in infrastructure development also 
share this assessment. The population also 
found the main economic benefit resulting 
from demining operations in the agricul-
ture sector.
Mine-risk education campaigns have 
considerable coverage since the surveyed 
population knows about the dangers posed 
by landmines and ongoing demining oper-
ations to reduce those dangers. Campaign 
results were decidedly positive since they 
reduced dangerous behaviors. 
The study results clearly show that 
landmine-affected communities were seriously 
affected at several levels before being cleared 
and reclassified as impact free, but it also 
shows the benefits from the humanitarian-
demining efforts perceived by the populations 
and their leaders. 
Carlos José Orozco serves as 
the Regional Coordinator of the 
OAS demining assistance program 
in Central America. He has been 
actively involved in mine action since 
1998, when he assumed the post of 
National Coordinator of the program in 
Nicaragua. He has expanded the mine-
action program to include a holistic 
victim-assistance vision that enables 
survivors to rejoin their communities 
in an economically sustainable way.
Carlos J. Orozco
Regional Coordintor 
for Central America 
AICMA
Organization of American States
De la Iglesia El Carmen 1 c y Media Abajo 
Frente a la Embajada de France 
Managua / Nicaragua
Tel: + 505 2266 1251
E-mail: corozco@oas.org
Web site: http://www.oas.org
The study also provides important in-
formation elements for national authorities 
to develop projects that would benefit the 
population living near dangerous areas, and 
to pursue full socioeconomic rehabilitation of 
these areas. 
See Endnotes, Page 112
T he Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Re-moval and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State initiated a humanitarian mine-action program in Colombia in Septem-
ber 2005. Since that time, PM/WRA has successfully assisted Colombia’s 
HMA program by providing the equipment, training and maintenance 
for two emergency response teams—in partnership with the Organiza-
tion of American States’ Acción Integral contra las Minas Antipersonal 
program—for operational humanitarian clearance. In January 2009, the 
government of Colombia launched a third ERT. The United States ex-
pects to provide the maintenance support for this newest team.
PM/WRA has also partnered with Colombian nongovernmental 
organizations, including the Centro Integral de la Rehabilación de 
Colombia, to target assistance to rural civilian victims through medical 
brigades and support centers. PM/WRA’s association with CIREC 
through its “Seeds of Hope” rural outreach program has helped hundreds 
of victims receive prostheses, wheelchairs and other assistive devices. 
Additionally, PM/WRA recently sponsored a mine-risk education 
program in the Antioquia department1 with the Colombian Campaign 
to Ban Landmines. The first phase of the MRE program targeted chil-
dren. The second phase of the grant funding will be released shortly; 
it will target the same communities, but its audience for MRE will be 
adults. Antioquia has the highest casualties from landmines among all 
Colombian departments. 
More must be done, however, by international donors to prevent in-
juries and help survivors in Colombia. The country stands at a signifi-
cant political and social turning point in its history; in recent years has 
been ranked No. 1 globally for new landmine casualties and No. 2 for 
internally displaced persons, 2, 3, 4, 5 stemming from the terrorist actions 
of Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. Various reports in-
dicate there are between three and four million displaced individuals 
within Colombia’s borders. Landmine relief is just one small piece of in-
ternational support needed to combat terrorism in Colombia. 
Insurgency Diminishing
Plan Colombia,6 which targets drug trafficking, has left a firm im-
print on counterinsurgency efforts in Colombia; the militant group 
FARC is largely considered to be on the run. The remnants of the 40-
year-old insurgent stronghold are currently subsisting through loosely 
U.S. Department of State’s 
Humanitarian Mine-action 
Support in Colombia
by Edmund Trimakas [ PM/WRA ]
Years of conflict between the Colombian government and the militant group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia have left the country littered with landmines and millions of internally displaced persons. The Colombian 
government is trying to address this situation. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Weapons Removal 
and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State is working with Colombian organizations and nongovernmental 
organizations to clean up contaminated areas and resettle Colombia’s IDPs. 
segregated cells without an existing political agenda. FARC survives 
by using an economic lifeline of drug and hostage enterprises with a 
limited life span.7 
Since President Álvaro Uribe took office, his new government is making 
strong and steady progress in the battle against terrorism. For instance:
1. Armed FARC forces have been cut in half. 
2. Attrition of FARC forces now surpasses losses attributed to mili-
tary action. 
3. International condemnation from former FARC allies is rising. 
4. The recent removal (voluntary and involuntarily) of key FARC 
leaders indicates a dissolution of centralized control, evident by 
the successful rescue of American hostages in July 2008. 
All these factors increasingly point to the conclusion that the policy 
begun at the turn of the millennium of squeezing the overall base and 
stronghold of terrorist operations is paying dividends. 
Recently, there have been large-scale public demonstrations protest-
ing FARC, including rallies and street demonstrations against FARC 
policies. FARC is no longer viewed as a political entity trying to liberate 
Research on Mine-detecting Bees in Croatia
Over the last two years, Zagreb University Agronomy Professor Nikola Kezic and his team have been training bees to detect 
landmines. Under Kezic’s direction, the bees are being trained for landmine detection in Croatia, which is still plagued with 
landmines from its civil war in the early 1990s. 
While mines are costly and time-consuming to find and remove, the bees can provide a quick and inexpensive approach 
to landmine removal. Known for their keen sense of smell, the bees are trained to associate the smell of food with explosive 
chemicals such as Trinitrotoluene, or TNT found in landmines. After training, the bees are sent to areas for quality assurance 
that have already been demined, where they search for the smell of explosives. If the bees land on an area where
no mine had previously been found, a demining team will investigate to make sure no mines have been overlooked.
A landmine is marked for clearance.
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Colombia; it is instead seen as a criminal out-
fit geared toward drugs, kidnapping and ter-
rorism, with no ideological backbone. Political 
consensus among Colombians for a solution 
to the terrorist issue continues to intensify, 
pointing to a mandate for a final resolution 
of the insurgency situation and a more lasting 
peace throughout Colombia. 
Colombia’s Future
The Colombian military and the Pro-
grama Presidencial de Acción Integral con-
tra las Minas Antipersonal, or PPAICMA 
(Presidential Program for Mine Action), have 
developed a detailed program to move mine 
assistance into the most highly affected re-
gions in Colombia. By 2011, Colombia’s HMA 
planners intend to train and equip 12 mobile 
ERTs in fixed locations within the 12 most-
affected departments of Colombia; they also 
plan to have two teams on standby. Currently, 
six humanitarian clearance teams exist—two 
each are sponsored by Canada, Colombia and 
the U.S. The two Canadian teams are relegat-
ed to the fixed, static cleanup8 of 34 military 
bases. By the end of 2011, these two fixed-site 
teams will have completed military site clean-
up and will be positioned to team with the 
other ERTs to focus on the more urgent hu-
manitarian need for clearance at remote civil-
ian sites. 
Demining Challenges
The four U.S.- and Canadian-supported 
ERTs have encountered significant difficul-
ties in achieving their desired goal of rapidly 
reintegrating former IDPs. ERT deployment 
prioritization has been difficult due to con-
flicting pressure points, including highly visi-
ble and volatile media events, a strong military 
proclivity to develop sites close to secure bas-
es with limited humanitarian appeal, a lack 
of strong community support, changing eco-
nomic and IDP patterns, and a lack of full and 
open commitment to developing accountable 
schedules for ERT deployment. 
There are several factors that need to be 
overcome to make operational clearance in 
Colombia successful. These include:
• Lack of technological readiness
• Lack of coordinated integration with-
in the affected community’s five-year 
planning process
• Labeling of IDPs as agents of the govern-
ment when they choose to cooperate and 
associate with Colombian authorities9
• Conf lict among Colombian and in-
ternational authorities about the ex-
tent of required clearance 
At present, Colombian planners have 
not determined a satisfactory intermediary 
course between full-scale cleanup and com-
munity integration and timely deployment 
to the many communities requiring assis-
tance. The two U.S.-sponsored projects in Bajo 
Grande, Bolivar and San Francisco, Antioquia, 
required more than twice the initially planned 
turn-around time of four months to complete 
community clearance and turnover. 
Authorities are under strong external 
constraints to continue to operate under a 
mandate for a completely mine-free10 pattern, 
largely avoiding the complexities and worries 
associated with employing international stan-
dards for sampling and area reduction. With 
a potential budget shortfall for planned ERT 
projects, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
something must give, and additional donors 
are needed or many communities will be left 
in the dark. 
In addition to funding shortfalls, incom-
plete community infrastructure and econom-
ic turmoil prevent a fully successful turnover 
of these projects to townspeople, who were 
forced to seek a semi-nomadic existence sev-
en or eight years ago by FARC forces. In Bajo 
Grande, lack of a definable water source, fully 
accessible roads, available health and school 
facilities as well as a redefined economic ag-
ricultural pattern are all obstacles for suc-
cessful community reintegration that were 
addressed by PPAICMA and Bajo Grande 
community leaders. 
In San Francisco, Antioquia, the integra-
tion has been smoother, largely because the 
surrounding area was not abandoned as it was 
in Bajo Grande. Until recently, security issues 
have deterred the townspeople from returning 
to San Francisco. This issue was resolved re-
cently, allowing full economic and social inte-
gration to occur. 
Additionally, economic conditions and ex-
pectations have changed over the last eight 
years since the internally displaced people 
have returned. One example is the expectation 
of returning IDPs to continue to farm tobacco, 
which was previously a successful cash crop. 
Upon returning, they found that the market 
has largely disappeared. Thus, it is paramount 
that there be a renewed focus on community 
planning for future development and success-
ful integration of IDPs. 
Progress
There have been some positive develop-
ments, however. One look at the former site 
of Bajo Grande, along the Sucre and Boli-
var borders, clearly indicates the extent of 
successful ERT operations. When site op-
erations began in November 2007, approx-
imately 30 former homes existed as mere 
shells, a result of abandonment and exposure 
to jungle overgrowth for seven years. Com-
pletion of mine and improvised explosive 
device cleanup in Bajo Grande took place 
in November 2008, and the town is steadily 
repopulating with former townspeople. Un-
fortunately, a majority of the displaced fam-
ilies were unable to return to their homes 
because infrastructure repair and services 
were not reinstituted. 
Future
James Madison University’s Mine Action 
Information Center and PM/WRA presented a 
demining planning conference in June 2009 in 
Bogotá, Colombia, to address a number of is-
sues with the Colombian players, including ci-
vilians, PPAICMA, Ministry of Defense, OAS, 
the Colombian military and other demining 
representatives. Participants developed a 13-
point Plan of Action on how to best integrate 
key stake holders, components and best prac-
tices into Colombian mine action. In the fall, 
the spotlight will again be on Colombia when 
the Second Review Conference of the Ottawa 
Convention takes place in Cartagena. 
See Endnotes, Page 112
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W hen describing the problem and its response, the ICRC re-fers to weapons-contamination activities rather than mine action. Institutionally, it feels this terminology more accu-
rately reflects the true nature of the problem in which explosive rem-
nants of war are often as problematic and prevalent as landmines. 
The raison d’être of ICRC fieldwork is to provide protection and as-
sistance to the civilian population affected by the internal armed conflict 
in Colombia. The ICRC seeks to reduce the impact of weapons contam-
ination where the organization has a comparative advantage in terms 
of access or capability in a given situation. Due to the severe impact of 
weapons contamination in Colombia, the ICRC substantially expanded 
its focus on weapons-contamination issues in 2007. It seeks to provide 
a multidisciplinary response to the needs of affected communities and 
victims in terms of data gathering, victim assistance, and preventive ac-
tivities. The focus of the ICRC’s work is a mixture of direct-action inter-
vention, support to the Colombian Red Cross weapons-contamination 
activities, and support and lobbying of government institutions. This 
article will summarize key aspects of the weapons-contamination situa-
tion in Colombia, and outline the ICRC and CRC movement response.
The Weapons-contamination Context
Colombia is substantially affected by the ongoing use of improvised 
explosive devices, primarily victim-activated, by parties to the conflict. 
In such a context, effective and widespread humanitarian mine clear-
ance is difficult, if not impossible. While the problem is widespread, 
analysis of the official casualty figures shows that in 2006 and 2007 more 
than 60 percent (340) of known civilian mine casualties and 50 per-
cent (813) of military casualties took place in just 40 of the 1,106 mu-
nicipal areas in Colombia, usually rural and remote areas.1 However, 
the problem of weapons contamination is extremely dynamic, and the 
focus of the problem has changed and continues to change substantially 
in recent years. Areas highly affected three to four years ago may no lon-
ger be similarly affected today. 
There are relatively few international and national organizations un-
dertaking weapons-contamination activities in Colombia, and no in-
ternational humanitarian mine-clearance agencies. Although donor 
interest has grown in recent years, implementation capacity remains rel-
atively limited. Additionally, while the capacity of the Colombian gov-
ernment to manage the subject has improved substantially, capacity to 
coordinate activities continues to be limited. 
ICRC Weapons-contamination 
Activities in Colombia 
by Andy Wheatley [ International Committee of the Red Cross ]
The International Committee of the Red Cross has been working alongside the Colombian Red Cross to ease 
Colombia’s weapons-contamination problem, made more difficult by ongoing conflict. By combining preventive 
measures, victim assistance, rehabilitation programs and economic aid, the ICRC has strengthened Colombian 
organizations, while educating the public and assisting those negatively affected by explosive remnants of war. 
The efforts of the ICRC have significantly helped Colombia where many other international organizations had 
found it difficult to assist because of the current political situation.
The fact that the country remains in conflict has a number of implica-
tions. Access by government services, nongovernmental and internation-
al organization is often extremely limited in the most conflict-affected 
parts of the country. This means that events often go unreported; civilian 
access to medical and other services is restricted; and the government, 
international community and civil-society organizations have limited 
capacity to respond. The result is often a mismatch between resources, 
A participant practices first aid skills in a course taught by Colombian Red Cross volunteers.
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